Contract Management Starts at the Beginning

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As part of a continuing discussion on contract management, former Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Steve Kelman, blogged about the need to focus on this issue on Federal Computer Week. 

Responding to this call, ASI Government is allowing access to some of their tools, which are normally only provided as part of a subscription to their Virtual Acquisition Office. These tools are a good primer on contract management, and should provide some useful reference for those seeking to learn more about how to effectively manage contracts.

Nonetheless, effective contract management can only be successful if a real, outcomes-based focus is done upfront, and before the contract is even awarded. The acquisition reform initiatives currently underway across government continue to be focused primarily on pre-award contracting functions, without a clear path on how to effectively manage these contracts once they are awarded.

Why has this been problematic? First and foremost, failed leadership continues to plague effective contract management. Either through a lack of attention to agencies' contracting activities, or the inability to properly analyze data through antiquated or ineffective contract management solutions, it seems like senior officials remain blissfully ignorant of waste and abuse. As reported by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in testimony from 1992: 

…In other cases, senior officials have not made managers accountable for effective contract administration, nor have they made a sufficient commitment to correct contracting problems that have surfaced…

It seems little has changed in the almost 25 years since this testimony was given. Even recent testimony by GAO describes ongoing issues with contract management, as they relate to services contracts: 

…As we testified before you in May, Mr. Chairman, agency procurements of services often are not being conducted as efficiently as they could be. We have found that too frequently agencies are not clearly defining their requirements, fully considering alternative solutions, performing vigorous price analyses, or adequately overseeing contractor performance. Such problems clearly point to a need for more focused management attention… 

This report describes several areas of needed improvement. Namely, strong Chief Acquisition Officers across government with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, improved training of the acquisition workforce, and better adoption of performance-based contracts.

However, if we want to start fixing contract management issues across government, we need to start at the beginning, and have leaders across government who recognize the problem. These leaders need to be engaged, and have the ability to address the problems from the ground up if we expect any real change.

Accountability Update: Is Anybody Listening?

Our recent blog post about accountability had some good discussions on the GS-1102 LinkedIn group (closed group) about who actually is responsible for accountability. Should it rest squarely on government? What responsibility does the contractor have when the government is asleep at the switch?

A recent issue seems to have blurred that line, prompting the people responsible for being taxpayer watchdogs to testify incredulously about the lack of concern and the seemingly “sweeping under the rug” of the topic of accountability all together.

John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, recently took the Army Corps of Engineers to task for ineffective management and oversight of work by DynCorp, which is owned by affiliates of New York-based Cerberus Capital Management LP, from responsibility while long-standing deficiencies remained for work on a garrison at Camp Pamir in Kunduz province.

“The Corps’ own internal review says they didn’t make DynCorp pay to fix their shoddy construction, they didn’t collect the liquidated damages that DynCorp owed them, and they violated their own settlement policies,” he said.

“But they still think the settlement was ’proper and reasonable.’” Sopko said. “That wasn’t a settlement, it was a mugging.”

An isolated incident, and a difficult one no doubt, but it is nonetheless disconcerting when an agency seemingly ignores such damming evidence, but decides it is best to sweep it under the rug and move on.

Given the billions that have already evaporated into the sands of Iraq, yet more evidence of how the lack of accountability is hindering progress coming out of Afghanistan is not surprising.

Having performance conversations early and often is the critical component of performance measurement, and then executing lessons learned for continuous improvement. Most, if not all contracts require some rudimentary form of performance measure (i.e. weekly status reports, monthly reports, performance meetings, etc.).

Other than killing trees, what is the point of doing all this if we are not going to mutually benefit and ensure proper outcomes and meeting contractual requirements?

Buying In Now Effectively Policy Across Government

In a recent breakfast  hosted by the Coalition for Government Procurement, Office of Federal Procurement Policy Administrator Joe Jordan effectively punted on the notion of best value versus the realities of federal procurement; lowest priced offers win contracts.

…Generally speaking, he said industry likes best-value procurements. They allow companies to propose higher prices, since officials will consider other evaluation criteria beyond price. On the other hand, the government is pushing low price and not always fully analyzing the entire lifecycle of a project, Jordan said. Both sides have good arguments, so the contracting officer's judgment is the final arbiter….

Due to the intense focus on budget cuts, and sequestration still casting a very ominous shadow on the federal government, price has become the most important factor in any source selection, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

Any talks of best value are out the window, so agencies should state as such in their solicitations. The issue really is about how do determine technical acceptability, given the foundations of what are normally poorly defined requirements.

Firstly, requirements for proper use of Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable (LPTA) should be very standardized, commodity based purchases that require no other factors other than price. That means just the commodity itself through very rigid, specific, and accurate requirements. No opportunities for customer service, shipping, transport, customization, etc. These requirements require the use of best value, and the ability to offer better service.

You get what you pay for. There lies the rub.

Often times, the government simply does not know what it wants. It thinks it does, so it puts horribly written Requests for Proposal on the street, that result in dozens and dozens of questions, since the requirements are either redundant, confusing, circular logic, not achievable, unrealistic, boilerplate and not applicable, etc. Further exacerbating the problem is the lack of engagement with industry during the pre-acquisition phase, assuring poor requirements. Lack of leadership, poor capabilities, and the excuse of lack of time are the usual suspects.

The pressures to save money are overwhelming, so prices are driven downward to unrealistic levels. Is anyone still doing cost realism assessments? You know the answer.

How often does the Government Accountability Office sustain a protest where the losing offeror, and often an incumbent, claims they lost to a competitor who underbid them by 40%, even though the incumbent knows exactly what the real cost of doing, at a satisfactory level, entails?

This vicious circle ensures performance will fail, and it is the lack of a long-term focus that is troublesome. Poor leadership, combined with continued declines in the skills and capabilities of the acquisition workforce (I include PMs in that bunch) have created a perfect storm of continued poor performance and waste. Just look at the fiasco that is the System for Award Management (SAM) for a perfect example of this.

The General Services Administration can claim SAM was best value, but price is kingmaker. “Buying In” is seen as an improper business practice per Federal Acquisition Regulation 3.501, but it seems to be standardized now.

Investment analysis is a foreign concept, since saving a few bucks today will lead to inevitable rise in costs tomorrow, failed programs, and poor performance.

Awarding to the lowest bidder is a disaster waiting to happen. Only when innovation is desired, through the use of performance-based contracting, combined with properly written requirements and effective contract management and execution, can best value be realized.

That is the best outcome for the taxpayer. Easier said than done.

Contractors and Procurement Officials: Customer Service Is A Two Way Street

There seems to be a development that is coming more and more to the forefront: the case of the out-of-control Contracting Officer (KO).

There are usually two paths to interactions with a KO, one being the KO who is overwhelmed with the workload, doing the best they can to handle it, and simply have very little interactions with the contractors. Further, these KOs are very professional, and want to help and guide businesses to be successful, especially small businesses.

This path I would say is the vast majority of the 1102s, and the environment that most contractors work in. That is to say that contract execution, and subsequent performance or contract issues, result in interactions mostly with Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR), and the Program Manager (PM). If you are dealing with the KO, you have some serious problems.

However, there seems to be encroachment in federal acquisition, and government contracting in general, of the second path of KOs, those who act as KO, COR, PM, judge, jury, and executioner. These KOs take advantage of their power over the contractors, and are the first to threaten termination when issues arise in performance, both actual and perceived.

I started a discussion on GovLoop about this topic, but it was something that perhaps no one wants to discuss. Certainly the manifestation of inexperience and subsequent performance issues by 1102s was covered recently in the Washington Post, but talking truth to power and holding those in power accountable can always be difficult, especially with vindictive acquisition personnel.

It should not, and does not, have to be this way. For every conversation I have with a small business colleague on a great relationship with a client, there seems to be another where a company is being crucified for one cent on an invoice, then being threatened with poor past performance and possible termination. What has gone wrong?

I think the pressure cooker that is being an 1102 is creating an environment where those in the trenches are being left to their own devices, without proper leadership, guidance, and direction. Since training on being a business advisor, negotiating, customer service, or understanding how businesses function is effectively non-existent, bad habits develop. Left unchecked, these bad apples rotten the organization, and it seems like more and more rot is advancing. Further, those bad habits get exacerbated by firms that get bullied and intimated, and enable this behavior because they fear being retaliated against through options that get dangled like weapons, or through adverse past performance.

Something has to give.

The mission has to come first, and the “gotcha” attitudes simply help create more problems for performance by both parties. Many contracts call for monthly meetings with stakeholders to discuss issues, and these platforms should be productive ways to help resolve problems, and help create trust and attitudes that enable an environment to work like partners, not adversaries.

It has been alarming at the rate of complaints by small businesses to small business advocates at federal agencies of maltreatment by procurement personnel, and the rise of protests is also a manifestation of these negative and mistrustful attitudes.

Of course, some companies deserve what they get when they under bid work, don’t perform, and simply use the government as an ATM.

However, contracts are expected to provide exceptional service for the taxpayer’s investment. That is a given, and understood. Nonetheless, that goal is a two-way street, and requires both parties to act in the best interest of the taxpayer.

Can’t we all just get along?

Smaller Piece Of The Pie For Small Businesses

With the end of the fiscal year upon us, the “feeding frenzy,” as I like to call it, is in full swing. With possible sweeping budgets on the horizon through sequestration, and overall declines in revenues, agencies are unloading end-of-year dollars at a dizzying pace.  It should be particularly good times for small businesses, as opportunities should be plentiful.

Alas, that is not entirely the case. It is the same story, but amplified. Smaller sized contracts, especially those that use simplified acquisition procedures, are still going to large businesses. According to the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), it is on track to be about 40%.

Large businesses are getting a surprisingly larger share of contracts that should be going to small businesses because they are known commodities, with a wealth of past performance in a risk-averse environment. However, the lack of small business focus by federal buyers is the main reason.

The single greatest factor is the one true common denominator, the acquisition workforce. A recent story in the Washington Post highlighted the problems industry is facing through the rise of inexperienced federal buyers, and the difficulties in not only awarding contracts, but managing them as well.   

One of the greatest challenges small businesses face is this inexperience. We can all acknowledge that the acquisition workforce is overworked and under-resourced. However, that excuse does wear thin. People need to do their jobs at the end of the day, that phantom word in the federal vernacular; accountability.

As a result, insufficient, or simply no market research, is being conducted to qualify small businesses as eligible for a given solicitation. The question seems to be, why be bothered? I have this large company over here doing everything under the sun; so let me make sure they win this contract. They have all the vehicles, the past performance, etc. They are a known entity. Sounds like a plan!

It is the path of least resistance, as qualifying small businesses, conducting a Request for Information, simply doing a Google search, simply takes too much time. Further, many program offices should be conducting this market research, but many do not understand their roles and responsibilities in the acquisition planning phase. A major point I make in training classes to PMs during Acquisition 101 classes.

The trend of awarding “small business” contracts to large businesses is endemic, and will not abate anytime soon. Small businesses can continue to hope for crumbs, or that someone in Congress actually pays attention to real issues affecting small businesses.

Service Contract Inventories: Missed Opportunities For Transparency

Last month, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a new report in April 2012 detailing a continuing issue at the Department of Defense (DoD) that is not foreign across government; the lack of transparency when it come to service contracts.

The GAO report looks at two issues inherent in the struggles at DoD; lack of clear oversight on service contracts and the continuing issue of contractors performing inherently governmental functions.

One issue identified was the reliance on the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) for the inventory for most defense components other than the Army.

DOD acknowledged a number of factors that limited the utility, accuracy, and completeness of the inventory data. For example, FPDS-NG does not identify more than one type of service purchased for each contract action, provide the number of contractor full-time equivalent personnel, or identify the requiring activity. As before, the Army used its Contractor Manpower Reporting Application to compile its fiscal year 2010 inventory. This system collects data reported by contractors on services performed at the contract line item level, including information on labor hours and the function and mission performed. DOD officials noted that the Army’s current process complies with legislative requirements.

What the GAO recommends is for DoD to create processes and adopt similar systems such as the Army, since the other services use their own methodologies, processes, or simply do not follow the requirements.

This problem is endemic across government, and I do not understand why GAO is recommending separate processes for DoD. This is a “big data” problem, as the requirements for transparency are not possible given the current data collection processes and systems anywhere.

The overall issue is one of workforce, and the need to analyze spending on the biggest expenditure, which is on service contracts. Without comprehensive, accurate data, how are decisions to be made on insourcing, continuity of service contracts for mission performance, and ensuring contractors are not performing inherently governmental functions.

The guidance from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy is more than adequate, and agencies are in full swing providing the information. However, the jury is still out on the utility of the information, let alone the accuracy. Further, the information on FTE counts is still mostly a work in progress, which seems to be a vital gap in this data collection exercise.

Most beneficial across government is not to create new systems, but to simply retool FPDS-NG to ensure that the data being collected is complete to meet the overall reporting requirements with a simple data field. Current contract management systems should automate this process, such that the complete data sets are collected from the contract file, which should include contract management data.

Combined with this relatively simple and inexpensive fix (let me take a deep breath as I write that), the Office of Management and Budget should provide more clear guidance on how to use the inventories in decision making regarding manpower, and the appropriate use of contractors.

This is a solid opportunity to consolidate a vital data issue that is common across government, but the GAO recommends that DoD and federal agencies should continue the fragmented approach to collecting this data.

This is one area where the “uniqueness” argument across organizational boundaries does not hold water. Transparency and the ability to make workforce decisions with complete and accurate data is a federal government issue, not just one for the Defense Department.

Ensuring Small Businesses Representation: Enforce the Rules

The issue of subcontracts management is a badly needed topic that has gotten little attention recently, either through proposed legislation, or anywhere else. I attended the Acquisition Excellence 2012 Conference a few weeks ago, jointly sponsored by the American Council for Technology (ACT) - Industry Advisory Council (IAC) and the General Services Administration, discussing with several procurement officials the need for subcontracting accountability. Mainly, ensuring that percent and dollar amounts in subcontracting plans were being adhered to and measured, in regards to performance. All the officials discussed what should happen, but all also acknowledged that not enough was being done.

This is perhaps one of the most important ways that small businesses can be represented in federal contracts. Most contracts have performance reporting requirements, but very rarely do they include a holistic approach to the contract. How is the prime performing on adherence to the subcontracting plan? The importance is usually on lines of code and spend rates, even going so far to manage firm fixed priced contracts like time and materials. An effective tree-killing exercise, but not a very productive one.

Subcontractors have little options when needing to address grievances against large firms. Some small businesses have had contracts terminated, positions taken, or simply not having promises made to them kept.

Procurement officials do not want to get involved, and small businesses have recently taken to the media and the courts for relief.

Performance on a contract should also entail integrity and honesty in dealing with subcontractors in regards to past performance, as the government does itself no favors in dealing with bad actors that don’t adhere to promises and contractual requirements in subcontract execution.

The continued focus on small business is certainly a positive, but the holistic approach and institutional issues endemic to small business contract failures need to be addressed.

Government can achieve its small business goals, no question. It is the desire to change, along with a concerted effort by leadership, which is required to succeed.

Contract Management 101: A FFP contract is not T&M

One thing that I have seen a lot of is the misapplication of performance-based contracting tenets, especially when it comes to requirements. Basically, some requirement offices slap “Performance Work Statement” as the title, delete “Statement of Work,” and maybe add some metrics and measures. Voila, a “performance-based contract” is born.

However, the contract line item numbers (CLINs) is really where I see performance-based acquisition (PBA) fall off the tracks. This text is straight out of a recent solicitation for a services contract on Federal Business Opportunities, commonly referred to as “fedbizopps” or FBO:

The Offeror shall provide their proposed firm-fixed price for this project by completing the CLIN Listing, in its entirety, as provided in the RFP. Additionally, the Offeror shall also provide a basis for the price, identifying all prospective labor categories, showing labor rates for all labor categories and discounts offered. (The Offerors shall also show profit, and any overhead costs if not included in the labor rate). Lack of detail may result in a rating of a higher risk by the Selection Authority in the selection process. 

Significant discounts are considered highly desirable. Discounts offered must be explicit. (There is no page limit for this factor, however Offerors are encouraged to only provide that cost and pricing data mandatory to a comprehensive review and that data which would allow the evaluation team to determine price reasonableness.)

Certainly great material to include in my classes when I teach PBA, Contracting Officer Representative (COR), or FAC P/PM courses on how not to structure CLINS under a PBA, or for a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract.

For starters, why do you care about this information? You shouldn’t. As a project manager (PM) or COR, you care about performance. Period. The other contract management efforts that will be expended on managing labor rates, labor categories, expenditures, etc. is inappropriate for this contract type, it adds extra administration and complexity into the contract management function, and takes the focus away on what you really care about; performance.

Further, the main objective of a FFP contract is to transfer risk to industry, with the assumption on a FFP contract type that the requirements are clearly defined and baselined. This model wants to eliminate that risk premium, and further drive prices down by threatening to add risk if these factors, which you shouldn’t care about, are not deemed “reasonable?” Protest anyone?

This model is creating a culture of “buying in,” deemed an improper business practice per FAR Subpart 3.5, but now a necessity as a result of budget cuts and the pressure to cut contracts.

PBA is about performance, and incentivizing industry to exceed requirements through a strategic partnership of trust and communication for both parties to excel. Let’s focus on that, and leave the administrative burdens where they belong.

Contract Management not Sexy, but Necessary

A recent Defense Department inspector general report found that contracting officers and their representatives (COR) at the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity need to step up their game when it comes to improving contract performance and acquisition outcomes.

The report shins a light on a reality hitting many procurement offices, where the intense workload, combined with a lack of enough skilled and trained 1102s, is creating an environment where quality is being sacrificed at the expense of performance.

Just taking a look at the topic headers is an eye-opening example of a procurement organization that is in need of serious improvements:

• Sole-Source Awards Not Adequately Justified
• Price Reasonableness Not Adequately Determined
• Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans Not Prepared
• Inadequate Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans
• Contracting Officer’s Representative Acceptance of Deliverables Not Documented
• Language in Contracting Officer’s Representative Letters Too General
• Invoice Review Needs Improvement

The recommendations are also somewhat disturbing, in that they basically outline what needs to happen to realize improvements and work to improve this organization. Mainly, the recommendations state that contracting officers and CORs need to do their jobs, since some of the responses the IGs received where common in this environment: lack of time, resources, and a focus on production.

Simple tools, such as checklists, can be created to ensure that ALL the requirements of a contract action are achieved. This may seem simplistic, but following the checklists, and having them executed through automated contract systems and solutions, will ensure that the proper steps have been conducted. Basically, contract actions can not bee executed until these issues have been eliminated by ensuring the proper steps an actions by procurement personnel have been followed and verified. This is ultimately creating an environment of accountability, and hopefully improved quality.

I don't have time is not a legitimate excuse, not under any circumstance. However, leadership needs to understand the needs of the organization, provide the proper level of oversight, resources, and training to the procurement staff, and ensure that things are being done properly. 

Best practices are plentiful, and they need to be acted on.

Contractors Are Mission Critical, Not a Necessary Evil

Former head of the Coalition for Government Procurement Larry Allen, now President of Allen Federal Business Partners, wrote a spot on article recently calling out the absurdity of the current environment of anti-contractor sentiment running rampant throughout the federal government.

Recent examples of these activities, among many, includes the Office of Management and Budget’s recent directive to ramp suspension and debarment operations, and the Air Force’s actual debarment of Iron Bow Technologies. Although this debarment was later overturned, it seems that this action was a direct result of the “get tough” policies.

Of note was the actual reversal, as a direct result of the Air Force and Iron Bow working together to address the issues leading up the debarment, and mitigation strategies to prevent any future occurrences. In other words, actions that should have occurred without the need of the seemingly knee-jerk debarment by the Air Force.

Further exacerbating the “greedy contractor” paradigm, and as noted by Allen, is Shay Assad, the director of pricing for the Department of Defense, announcing a more stringent pricing policy with contractors, in addition to the directions to cut service contracts by another 20 percent. Now with the Senate passing a Defense Authorization Bill that caps executive pay for contractors at $400,000, it seems that senior federal officials feel the need to squeeze the vice even further.

With the government continuing to freeze pay and hiring in critical areas, in addition to offering early buyouts, the expected outcome can only be further erosion of performance. With fewer government personnel, in addition fewer qualified and trained personnel since training is also getting cut, waste, fraud, and abuse will keep the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector Generals gainfully employed. On second thought, GAO is also cutting staff. Perhaps the Commission of Wartime Contracting will reopen its doors in the near future to report on billions in waste, and just drop the Wartime from its title.

Contractors perform vital functions, and more pressure will be put on industry to perform more with less. However, it is being done in an environment where profit margins are being cut to the bone, lowest cost is now the only variable, and many small businesses are in danger of extinction with cuts to contracts, and subcontracts.

The fact is this: Contractors perform messy services that no one else wants to do. They fix things that break in the middle of the night. They are absolutely essential to the efficient running of the enterprise. They should be treated with the respect commensurate with the role they play. Mistakes happen, and bad actors exist. But it’s past time to give credit where it is due.

We would be better served working together, and stopping this animosity.

GAO and Success: Acquisition Workforce the Common Factor

With the collapse of the Congressional “supercommittee’s” budget deal on deficit reduction, federal managers, and their industry counterparts, are being told to prepare for the worst , as possible mandatory cuts are on the horizon for 2013.

In the mean time, federal managers will need to continue to find ways to save money and do more with less. To help programs succeed, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently came out with a report that highlights best practices for IT acquisition and execution. Combined with the Office of Management and Budget's 25 point IT reform plan, these two products create a powerful blueprint for what programs should be doing to improve outcomes, and be considered successful by meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals.

The one common denominator for program success is a steady, skilled acquisition workforce to execute these other principals. This should not come as a surprise. However, what was surprising is that the Defense Information Systems Agency's Global Combat Support System-Joint program did not list this fact as a critical success factor (similar to 6 out of 7 dentists recommend flossing for healthy teeth? Who actually goes to that one dentist?)

Putting aside the other factors, having a skilled, trained and stable acquisition workforce is critical to success in any program, and more than now than ever. The acquisition workforce, especially in contracting, must be able to act as business advisors and really lead the way in helping shape sound business practices. This includes pre-acquisition through contract execution. The program manager, in addition to the use of Integrated Program Teams, also are critical to ensuring that everyone is building requirements properly, proper contracts and metrics are in place, and then of course executing using the sound business practices categorized in the GAO report.

Regretfully, these budgets cuts and contract reductions can only be a detriment to implementing these best practices. With hiring freezes, reducing training budgets, and mandates to cut services contracts (such as acquisition support contracts), fewer opportunities will exist to improve performance. Coupled with the "low price at all cost" contract selection methodology, a thousand cuts are on the way to an environment of even further reduced performance, in addition to more fraud, waste, and abuse.

GAO and Inspector Generals will be quite busy in the next 24 months, but reports of program success will more than likely be a distant memory in this future timeframe.

How Do You Stop A Contracting Disaster?

In light of the new inherently governmental rules that have been published by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, decision making by the government in regard to acquisition strategy comes to mind. When it comes to hiring contractors to assist in performing acquisition functions, it is very much a caveat emptor situation.

Contracting is a difficult subject, that requires expertise. There are many IT and Program Management firms that continue to receive contracts to provide acquisition support, although they do not have the competency or the skill set to provide it. They just happen to be there providing other support services, are an 8(a) so you can sole-source a contract, or see these opportunities because of the desperate need by government. So why not assist with procurements? It is just paper-pushing anyway, with little value-added service, right? Hardly.

What is happening is that IT Program Managers with a few DAU classes under their belts are making incompetent recommendations related to contract type, acquisition strategy, and requirements. Because the federal IT clients do not understand contracting, and the acquisition shops are overloaded and not providing sound business advice, the government relies on poor advice in its decision making.

Contracts worth millions, sometimes hundreds of millions, are being made in this dysfunctional environment. The government continues to bleed, and incompetent contractors continue to be paid. The inherently governmental rules allow contractors to provide guidance and advice, but little vetting of competency and skill set seems to be happening due to pressures of desperately needing support, and the need to increase contract throughput. These services, when done right, can be very critical to supporting this crucial government management mission. I am not advocating they go away, but in looking at inherently governmental functions, the government really needs to be careful what it is getting and why.

How can we honestly discuss acquisition reform when this environment exists?

Contingency Contracting Failures: It's About the People

The big story before the Labor Day holiday was the release of the final report by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC). According to the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), the enormous dollar volume of waste and the assumption of the over-reliance on contractors for contingency operations was the focus of the report. I very much respect POGO's work, but I respectfully disagree.

The major issue is the quality of the acquisition workforce. In agreement was Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-MO), who stated that two areas in the report that jumped out to her was the Defense Department culture and the lack of qualified and too few contracting professionals as main reasons for the waste. Although I normally focus on quality, it was the quantity on this issue that was also a major failure.

..."I think the dirty little secret that has now been exposed-in fact this goes governmentwide and not just in wartime contracting-is that if you don't have the personnel that work for the federal government, rather than increase the personnel and the costs associated with that, go out and contract," she said. "This has occurred to a large extent in the Department of Homeland Security, it's occurred in a number of places and we have been doing that while we have hollowed out our acquisition personnel. We need to make investment in government employees that know how to police this and we frankly have dropped the ball in that regard."...

What the report simply fails to address is the political realities made with these decisions. Hearts and minds needed to be won, and thus materialized the pictures in Iraq of U.S. personnel sitting a top pallets of U.S. currency, handing it out like candy to win favor in line with local cultural norms. In Afghanistan, bounties were paid to find "terrorists,"so locals sold their neighbors up the river to win favor with the U.S., make more money than they ever have before, and take over land and settle old scores. Warlords also were paid off, although sympathies to al Qaeda and Taliban forces continue to be difficult to determine. How much waste went to the enemy? Perhaps that is the $30 Billion that the report mentions in possible unaccounted for waste. Any oversight with these issues?

The realities for personnel are that contingency contracting may be one of the most difficult areas of contract management, as local customs and norms may interfere with transparency and oversight, making the glaring lack of adequate training even more difficult to comprehend. Further, how many people across Defense, State, and USAID have any formal training? Obviously not enough. It got so bad that Defense was actually considering giving every lowly grunt going into theatre some form of contract training!

Coordination and collaboration across these agencies means creating a Contingency Contracting Corps, shared among the agencies, that can perform the contingency contracting mission across the globe. They would be the "special forces" of contracting; the tip of the spear to ensure accountability to the taxpayer. This of course requires a massive overhaul in the training curriculum available to the acquisition workforce, which of course needs to include revamping services contracting and commercial item acquisition. A much broader skill set would also need to be considered, one that needs to be factored in for hiring or designation to this mission.

After 10 years of war, and the 15 strategic recommendations made by the Commission, I hope that Congress understands the issues at stake. We need to invest in the acquisition workforce, and fully fund these initiatives that can have vast returns with upfront investments. I would like to think that government management of this scale would easily be an election year issue, but perhaps it will not make effective sound bites.

MythBusters Call For Participation

Continuing the ongoing campaign to improve government and industry relations through the "Mythbusters" initiatives, the American Council for Technology (ACT) - Industry Advisory Council (IAC) has put up an initial list for comment and expansion to deliver on finding the "Top Ten."

Please visit the BetterGovernmentIT.org site to offer your comments and suggestions, and to vote on the top ten vendor-friendly strategies. The site will be active until 9/9! Help us help Government – visit bettergovernmentit.org and provide your input!

Industry and Government Relations Continue To Be A Challenge

Recently at the National Contract Management Association’s World Congress in Denver, the clouds and storms that rolled into the mile-high city were harbingers of things to come for the week as the relationship between government and industry seems to continue a downward trend at a time when it needs to improve. However, it is the current adversarial atmosphere that was on full display at the conference and illustrated the difficulties that lay ahead in improving and creating an environment of productive communications.

The conference kicked off with an address by Linda Hudson, CEO for BAE Systems, who explained the difficulties that businesses currently face, and the troubles that are on the horizon. A panel session proceeded immediately following the speech, aptly entitled “Show Me the Money—Corporate Survival in Tough Economic Times.”

It is simply a matter a fact that budgets will shrink or remain flat for the foreseeable future, and businesses must adjust to this reality. However, another reality is the ever increasing pile of regulations, oversight, and scrutiny that contractors must continue to deal with. From new ethics regulations, numerous reporting requirements, and ever increasing mandates on security, contractors must comply with this new environment and the subsequent increases in costs of doing business. There simply is no choice, either comply or fold. It is this compliance with current, and what can only be more and more future regulations and increasing oversight, that creates the choices for industry in how they can try to remain competitive. These choices will result in increasing layoffs, scaling back of benefits, decreasing small business subcontracting opportunities, and a restructuring of the industrial base to remain viable and profitable.

Further exacerbating the issue is the continued focus on risk-transference to industry through more and more focus on fixed price contracts, regardless of requirements. Because requirements continue to be poorly or inadequately defined, the result is increased costs to both industry and government in time and money to adhere to a construct that should have never been developed in the first place. This leads to industry having to continue readjusting their pricing strategies to remain competitive through lower and lower priced bids, to the point where margins are razor thin and profitability suffers even more.

I was disappointed at remarks made by Dr. Steve Kelman on his FCW blog, as he seemed to ignore the fact that industry is facing the most difficult period in some time, and will continue to suffer. Barely mentioned is the vulnerability of small businesses, who will face fewer opportunities and even more risk through insourcing. This issue was barely addressed by both the panel and Dr. Kelman, a significant deficiency that I addressed to the panel via a question, but it did not get answered. It is comments like Dr. Kelman’s and the environment he describes that illustrates the work ahead.

The real factor to working in this environment productively is through increased and transparent communications between government and industry, and an understanding that both sides actually do have the same objective. That is, completing a mission on time, and within budget. However, that reality and the current environment for industry seem to be lost on government, and the tone at the NCMA conference exacerbated the “us versus them” attitude. Both sides need to understand the mission from each side’s perspective, and understand the impacts actions have on completing that mission. This is of vital interest to effective government management, and deteriorating relationships will make getting the job done that much more difficult for all parties in the challenging times that lay ahead.