Accountability Update: Is Anybody Listening?

Our recent blog post about accountability had some good discussions on the GS-1102 LinkedIn group (closed group) about who actually is responsible for accountability. Should it rest squarely on government? What responsibility does the contractor have when the government is asleep at the switch?

A recent issue seems to have blurred that line, prompting the people responsible for being taxpayer watchdogs to testify incredulously about the lack of concern and the seemingly “sweeping under the rug” of the topic of accountability all together.

John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, recently took the Army Corps of Engineers to task for ineffective management and oversight of work by DynCorp, which is owned by affiliates of New York-based Cerberus Capital Management LP, from responsibility while long-standing deficiencies remained for work on a garrison at Camp Pamir in Kunduz province.

“The Corps’ own internal review says they didn’t make DynCorp pay to fix their shoddy construction, they didn’t collect the liquidated damages that DynCorp owed them, and they violated their own settlement policies,” he said.

“But they still think the settlement was ’proper and reasonable.’” Sopko said. “That wasn’t a settlement, it was a mugging.”

An isolated incident, and a difficult one no doubt, but it is nonetheless disconcerting when an agency seemingly ignores such damming evidence, but decides it is best to sweep it under the rug and move on.

Given the billions that have already evaporated into the sands of Iraq, yet more evidence of how the lack of accountability is hindering progress coming out of Afghanistan is not surprising.

Having performance conversations early and often is the critical component of performance measurement, and then executing lessons learned for continuous improvement. Most, if not all contracts require some rudimentary form of performance measure (i.e. weekly status reports, monthly reports, performance meetings, etc.).

Other than killing trees, what is the point of doing all this if we are not going to mutually benefit and ensure proper outcomes and meeting contractual requirements?

The Acquisition Workforce: Are We Going Backwards?

As the meat grinder of sequestration continues to move forward, the initiatives to improve and develop the acquisition workforce will more than likely come to a grinding halt, and move capabilities backwards at a time where forward movement is badly needed.

At this past week’s 2013 Acquisition Excellence Conference, The American Council for Technology-Industry Advisory Council and the General Services Administration (GSA) co-hosted what was dubbed a "training and education" event, but according to those that attended, the unspoken theme was “doing more with less” and strategic sourcing.

I regretfully was unable to attend, but it sounds like perhaps the conference was a missed opportunity to really “train and educate.” However, the fact that the conference experienced 30% less attendance from last year, that number is a symbol of what seems to be happening all across the board in the development of the acquisition workforce.

Make no mistake; the acquisition workforce is in crisis mode. With budget cuts and continued uncertainty, the opportunities to educate and develop the workforce will shrink accordingly.

This point was analyzed through the excellent publication from the Professional Service’s Council biennial Acquisition Policy Survey (formerly the Procurement Policy Survey). The section of Budget Stability discussed “doing more with less,” which also includes who will be doing the buying. Which leaves an interesting question: Who will be doing the buying?

According to Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Joe Jordan, it may be left in the hands on the less experienced:

…The top federal procurement officer on Thursday called for “not a tweak but a full rethink” of the government’s planning for its acquisition workforce, warning that as many as 40 percent of the 36,000 federal contracting officers could retire in the next five years.

Joe Jordan, administrator of the White House Office of Federal Procurement Policy, compared the coming brain drain to water flowing out of a “giant bathtub,” saying he plans to push agencies to “widen the aperture of who they recruit.”…

Adding insult to injury is the fact that due to budgets cuts, contractor support will also be cut, along with retirees coming back as consultants. We have no choice but to hand the keys over those with the equivalent of learner’s permits.

We now are back to the original issue: How do we assure the acquisition workforce has the capabilities to perform these most difficult missions under severe budgetary pressures and through less experienced 1102s?

OFPP Administrator Joe Jordan recently signed a service-level agreement (SLA) between OFPP and GSA to strengthen their cooperation and commitment to the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI), who I like to call the “red-headed step child” of the training institutions in government. What Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is to Defense acquisition workers, FAI is to non-Defense 1102s.

Therein lies the rub, where is the money? Is there a monetary commitment with this SLA? DAU has traditional gotten vast sums of money, much more than FAI in the past, which is why I gave FAI that moniker. Should we not be preparing all acquisition workers (which I include program managers) equally to perform effectively?

We can talk all day about people, but until a financial investment is slated and properly used to educate and develop the acquisition workforce, we will continue to experience gaps in skill sets and capabilities.

Not a silver bullet of course, but educating 1102s on effective and proper practices on how best to execute their missions is important nonetheless. Based on fewer opportunities to attend conferences, classes (in some cases mandatory for certification), and overall training and development, we can expect to go backwards in how we award and manage contracts.

Not a particularly welcome prospect.

Lack of Accountability Hinders Contractor Oversight and Performance

The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) is hoping that third time really is the charm in its seemingly desperate attempts at getting agencies to properly document contractor performance using the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS). Although similar memos in 2009 and 2011 (here and here) focused on this issue of poor past performance data, little has changed.

As a result, OFPP Administrator Joe Jordan has issued his third wave of these memos earlier last week, where he outlined specific targets for PPIRS usage and outlining other initiatives to help with the inconsistent documenting of contractor performance.

The new memo outlines stepped targeting and goals, based on the level of agency inconsistency, so that better performing agencies have higher goals than agencies performing poorly. This certainly makes sense, given that not all agencies are performing at the same level so it would be nonsensical to expect all agencies to perform and abide by the regulations. All agencies are expected to be at 100% reporting by 2015.

Although the memo discusses targets and the actions taken to date, they have had little impact in improving past performance data.

According to the memo:

...OFPP has developed a MAX site that includes metrics from the standard

PPIRS Compliance Metric Report and allows for agencies to record their baseline and target information at https://max.omb.gov/community/x/JoNKJQ. A summary of the reports and tools available for use in this exercise are listed in Attachment 1, and the site will also include best practices gathered from earlier OFPP-led Acquisition Status (AcqStat) meetings...

What ever happened to those AcqStat meetings, where senior procurement officials where so supposed to review data and make strategic decisions to improve performance outcomes? According to Freedom of Information Act requests obtained by FierceGovernment, not much. Other than sign in sheets, the lack of transparency was alarming, if not expected.

I often advocate for fewer regulations and oversight, and there is absolutely no need to create new ones to address this issue. Nonetheless, improvements in this area can go a long way to help transform how contractors are selected for awards, and dramatically improve outcomes.

However, it is Page 3 of the memo that is most important to help understand the current failures, and the recommended actions that should be properly implemented that would have a dramatic effect:

...In support of this effort, agency CAOs and SPEs must also take the following steps to ensure that relevant performance and integrity material is reported appropriately:

1. Communicate to the workforce the importance of using past performance information, including the need to have frequent communication with contractors - such as holding interim evaluations to address performance issues, and share the agency’s plans for achieving success in this area;

2. Hold staff accountable for improving the quality and quantity of the information; [emphasis added]

3. Motivate employees to take action to fulfill this responsibility and use innovative practices to meet this requirement; and

4. Consider recognizing acquisition professionals who contribute to improvements in this area, such as through the annual CAO Council Acquisition

Excellence Awards…

Although I believe #3 above is redundant, certainly understanding the need of why this information is needed, and training the workforce on how to properly perform these reviews, are critical for these new goals to be met.

We can of course forget the opportunities for training and educating the workforce should the ridiculous meat-cleaver of Sequestration go into full effect, although those opportunities are already starting to disappear fast.

Nonetheless, what the memo fails to address is why the information is not being entered into PPIRS to begin with, and also why contractor oversight is currently so lax. It is a startling abrogation of ones duties to those responsible with being stewards of taxpayers money, and one that needs corrective actions through enforcement and proper program management.

For starters, some contracting officers that I have spoken to have taken the same attitude towards muted debriefs and the lack of transparency for reporting contractors demonstrating poor performance; that is to say "better safe than sorry, no thanks."

Because contractors have the right to appeal poor reviews, (rightly I might add, to defend against over-zealous officials abusing their power) some procurement officials just don't want to deal with the hassle. Although proper documentation should exist to demonstrate repeated poor performance, many argue the battles are not worth it.

Exacerbating the issue are highly performing procurement officials who get no top-cover from leadership due to the too-cozy relationships they have with contractors. The attitude is one of frustration, indifference, or simply ignorance.

Further, why should they? As a senior level procurement official told me while discussing the issue of the overall lack of accountability in the procurement process,

"People get paid every two weeks, if they perform or not."

I think it is safe to say we need to change this attitude. Past performance, especially for services, should be one of the most important evaluation criteria in selecting a contractor for award. However, the incomplete or missing data, combined with allowing contractors to submit their own evaluations from favored customers, often does not allow for differentiation and drives evaluations in areas that often let irresponsible contractors get way with murder because they offer ridiculously low-prices to win work in this era of institutionalizing "buying in."

In addition, what is the point of requiring in contracts status reports, weekly deliverables, monthly reports and deliverables, etc. in the areas of program management if they are not going to be used to address the issue of performance? What is the point of doing this? What contract does not already contain the interim status reviews being recommended?

Other than creating pretty pie charts, graphics, and killing trees, this vast amount of performance information is not being used properly, nor does it improve outcomes. I believe the lack of project management capability of the acquisition workforce is obviously an issue, but the one-two combination of poor accountability adds fuel to the fire.

Doing more with less is the foreseeable future in how we manage government contracts, but until enforcement and education really happen, we are epitomizing the definition of madness.

Ensuring Small Businesses Representation: Enforce the Rules

The issue of subcontracts management is a badly needed topic that has gotten little attention recently, either through proposed legislation, or anywhere else. I attended the Acquisition Excellence 2012 Conference a few weeks ago, jointly sponsored by the American Council for Technology (ACT) - Industry Advisory Council (IAC) and the General Services Administration, discussing with several procurement officials the need for subcontracting accountability. Mainly, ensuring that percent and dollar amounts in subcontracting plans were being adhered to and measured, in regards to performance. All the officials discussed what should happen, but all also acknowledged that not enough was being done.

This is perhaps one of the most important ways that small businesses can be represented in federal contracts. Most contracts have performance reporting requirements, but very rarely do they include a holistic approach to the contract. How is the prime performing on adherence to the subcontracting plan? The importance is usually on lines of code and spend rates, even going so far to manage firm fixed priced contracts like time and materials. An effective tree-killing exercise, but not a very productive one.

Subcontractors have little options when needing to address grievances against large firms. Some small businesses have had contracts terminated, positions taken, or simply not having promises made to them kept.

Procurement officials do not want to get involved, and small businesses have recently taken to the media and the courts for relief.

Performance on a contract should also entail integrity and honesty in dealing with subcontractors in regards to past performance, as the government does itself no favors in dealing with bad actors that don’t adhere to promises and contractual requirements in subcontract execution.

The continued focus on small business is certainly a positive, but the holistic approach and institutional issues endemic to small business contract failures need to be addressed.

Government can achieve its small business goals, no question. It is the desire to change, along with a concerted effort by leadership, which is required to succeed.

GAO and Success: Acquisition Workforce the Common Factor

With the collapse of the Congressional “supercommittee’s” budget deal on deficit reduction, federal managers, and their industry counterparts, are being told to prepare for the worst , as possible mandatory cuts are on the horizon for 2013.

In the mean time, federal managers will need to continue to find ways to save money and do more with less. To help programs succeed, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently came out with a report that highlights best practices for IT acquisition and execution. Combined with the Office of Management and Budget's 25 point IT reform plan, these two products create a powerful blueprint for what programs should be doing to improve outcomes, and be considered successful by meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals.

The one common denominator for program success is a steady, skilled acquisition workforce to execute these other principals. This should not come as a surprise. However, what was surprising is that the Defense Information Systems Agency's Global Combat Support System-Joint program did not list this fact as a critical success factor (similar to 6 out of 7 dentists recommend flossing for healthy teeth? Who actually goes to that one dentist?)

Putting aside the other factors, having a skilled, trained and stable acquisition workforce is critical to success in any program, and more than now than ever. The acquisition workforce, especially in contracting, must be able to act as business advisors and really lead the way in helping shape sound business practices. This includes pre-acquisition through contract execution. The program manager, in addition to the use of Integrated Program Teams, also are critical to ensuring that everyone is building requirements properly, proper contracts and metrics are in place, and then of course executing using the sound business practices categorized in the GAO report.

Regretfully, these budgets cuts and contract reductions can only be a detriment to implementing these best practices. With hiring freezes, reducing training budgets, and mandates to cut services contracts (such as acquisition support contracts), fewer opportunities will exist to improve performance. Coupled with the "low price at all cost" contract selection methodology, a thousand cuts are on the way to an environment of even further reduced performance, in addition to more fraud, waste, and abuse.

GAO and Inspector Generals will be quite busy in the next 24 months, but reports of program success will more than likely be a distant memory in this future timeframe.

How to Improve Government/Industry Communications in Acquisition?

I was on Federal News Radio and In Depth with Francis Rose to discuss the Better Government IT initiative and the work the group is doing to improve the acquistion process and create best practices for government/industry communications. Some thoughts for consideration:

• What are some ways we can improve the process?
• What are some areas you see that are difficult, either from industry's side, or from government's?
• What feedback can we give to both buyers and sellers to improve communications during the acquisition process?
• What are some areas the Better Government IT initiative should focus on?
• What communications best practices would you propose?
• What communications practices should be adopted during contract management?
• What Web 2.0 tools can be implemented in this process?
• What program management tools would help increase communications?

Please join the discussion!

Executing Requirements Is Not A Zero Sum Game

As government watchdog groups continue to focus on ways to reform the acquisition process and create greater transparency, the issue of requirements seems to be a common denominator for many examples of waste, fraud, and abuse in federal procurement.

Dr. Steve Kelman wrote on his Federal Computer Week blog The Lectern about approaching the issue from the perspective of the acquisition phase. This interesting perspective offers a lot of promise, as the current process is simply not sufficient to find true best value in federal procurements. Now, vendors are made to endure writing contests in response to a government solicitation at great time and expense that don’t necessarily respond to the government’s needs. It becomes about the writing and not the substance. The result is that contractors either do not execute on what they proposed, or the government does not manage the contract effectively by holding contractors accountable, or a combination of both. How do we prevent this from happening?

One approach is the use of oral presentations. Although this technique is gathering more traction in procurements, especially for IT, it should be used with more frequency to evaluate an offeror as a potential business partner. Because of the focus on the written response, many government contractors have proposal development experts or even proposal development organizations within their respective companies that have years of experience responding to federal proposals. The end result is that contractors are great at responding to proposals, but without those responsible for actually doing the work being more involved in writing proposals, the execution will be lacking.

This approach of involving the implementers would go much further in ensuring a proposal is more than just eloquent prose, but an actionable document that becomes part of the contract, and how it will be executed and managed. Many procurement officials are left wondering if vendor program managers even read their own proposals. Government officials who do not hold contractors accountable for the successful outcome of a program exacerbate this process. The result is failure, or the status quo. Supplementing written submissions with oral presentation can help alleviate this problem by ensuring the government can have a face-to-face meeting with a potential contractor, and get a better sense of what they are buying.

For oral presentations to be successful, the government must require that the vendor personnel who will actively manage and execute the program be the ones to conduct the presentation. Otherwise, the government will get business development personnel who are trained, and excel, in selling. The government needs to focus on executing, not marketing.

Further, these oral presentations need to be rated and evaluated as part of the source selection. Increasingly oral presentations are conducted with little effort toward ensuring a program can be successful or that the offeror is a good fit to solve the government’s problem. Oral presentations are an excellent way to cut through the smoke screen of a wonderfully written proposal that either does not fully address the government’s need, is fraught with risk, or simply is marketing disguised as solutions.

Another effective tool that should be used more frequently is the post-award conference which brings together key individuals from both sides, and ensures both accountability and responsibility are at the forefront of contract management and execution. This sets up both parties for success by ensuring that the contractor understands the government’s requirements and that roles and responsibilities are established for all parties. It also ensures the government understands the proposed solution, associated risks, quality control, program management, and issues in administering the contract. Hosting ineffective conferences or simply not conducting them at all on complex acquisitions, and for many other IT programs, is inexcusable. The current process of government and industry program managers shaking hands and going off to the races to waste taxpayer money must come to an end.

Although these techniques are nothing new, they can go a long way to turning around poor acquisition outcomes. Certainly the current requirements development process is broken and needs to have a thorough review to address. However, executing on current federal requirements can see improvements if both industry and government understand that they are not reinventing the wheel. Slight changes in business processes and conducting effective contract management require simply adhering to disciplined implementation.