Acquiring Technology with the Wrong Process

In regards to acquisition reform, the overarching principle should be to streamline processes, eliminate waste, and create a balanced approach to long-term solutions through careful analysis. Although the jury is still out in my mind if that is happening over all the rhetoric being spouted by Congress, one bright spot in this process was the March 2009 Defense Science Board Task Force report Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information Technology.

The primary conclusion of the task force is that the conventional DoD acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to effectively or timely acquire and maintain current technology. Further, the current acquisition process is modeled after weapon systems. Even the current and updated DoD 5000 process is still not the answer for IT. This is the equivalent of the continuous focus by DoD to sink billions into weapons systems to fight the wars of yesterday when the battlefield and needs of asymmetrical warfare and the wars of tomorrow go largely unmet.

IT systems require continuous changes and upgrades, and are evolving faster than the DoD can acquire them (e.g. Moore’s Law). Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn recently spoke about the challenges of acquiring technology, with a focus on what IT should be purchased and the paradigm shift that needs to occur if the Defense Science Board recommendations are to be effective, if and when they are implemented:

…"We have a tendency to reach for the exotic technology that looks like [it allows for] the highest performance," Lynn said. "It's appealing on a PowerPoint slide, but unfortunately, we need the engineering and technological maturity to make it happen and we don't always have that."

A related challenge is ensuring that contracts don't call for technology that doesn't exist. While a requirement may be "good to have," acquiring the technology or engineering capacity to meet it could cost more or take longer than it is worth, he said.

Lynn named these technology-related issues as the leading cause of schedule delays and cost overruns, but said the key to reforming the department's acquisition processes is people. The budget Defense plans to submit on Thursday will propose a 20,000 person increase in the acquisition workforce between fiscal 2010 and 2015, he said.

Acquiring mature technology needs to be a focus area in the discipline approach brought to DoD by new Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Ashton Carter. These mature technologies will include COTS, such that initial faults, inherent problems, and risks have been largely removed or reduced. Some of the principle cost drivers of weapons systems have been the immature technologies that are coveted at DoD, and have so far underperformed or cannot be delivered because the technology simply does not exist or cannot be fully developed.

With this change in focus on acquiring the right technology, the task force recommendations on how to obtain that technology can go a long way to ensure long term reform of the defense acquisition process, and ensure a streamlined process exists for the acquisition of IT.

The task force offered the following recommendations to change the defense acquisition process in regards to IT acquisition:

1) A new acquisition process for information technology should be developed—modeled on successful commercial practices, for the rapid acquisition and continuous upgrade and improvement of IT capabilities. The process should be agile and geared to delivering meaningful increments of capability in approximately 18 months or less—increments that are prioritized based on need and technical readiness.

2) Expanded roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks an Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer (ASD (NII)/DOD CIO). The ASD (NII)/DOD CIO should have strong authorities and responsibilities for enterprise-wide information policy, enterprise architecture issues, and system engineering.

3) Consolidation of all acquisition oversight of information technology under the USD (AT&L) by moving into that organization, those elements of the ASD (NII)/DOD CIO and Business Transformation Agency organizations responsible for IT acquisition oversight.

4) Ensure the government managers responsible for program execution have the proper acquisition expertise for a successful enterprise IT system acquisition. The right skills sets must include a track record of success, and these leaders must have relevant business experience in the appropriate areas of acquisition, product development, and management.

IT systems are critical to both national security and effective government management. Therefore, the recommendations made by the Defense Science Board, along with the execution of the focused acquisition discipline promised by Mr. Hunter, will go a long way to ensure the DoD can keep pace with the speed of change and the new capabilities being introduced in today’s information age to keep DoD ahead of our adversaries and the world’s leader in technology.

DoD Acquisition Chief Leaves Post by Firing Parting Shots

In a refreshing piece of candor, outgoing Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics John J. Young, Jr. gave his final media roundtable, where he expressed concerns that the attention being paid to acquisition reform and revamping the acquisition process will lead to more regulations and oversight, and put additional burdens on the acquisition community. Of particular concern was the need to allow acquisition professionals to focus on running their programs:

…"The process we're heading further into is a tax code-like governance process for defense acquisition," Young said. "The more we do this, the more program managers will have to do to comply and they'll spend less time managing their programs."…

I share this concern with Mr. Young, particularly with the focus on contracting tools and procedures that have come out of the White House in President Obama’s OMB directive, and the possible handcuffing of contracting tools by limiting cost type contracts in favor of fixed type contracts. What I am referring to is the creation of further regulations and legislative actions that do not make sense, and may make the difficult jobs of acquisition professionals even harder. Further, these legislative actions rarely are done with a concern for empirical data and impact on costs, as legislators only focus on perceived benefits which also are difficult to measure without a sound business case for why a change may be needed. The costs of implementing legislation should never exceed the desired outcomes or benefits, but this type of logic is demanded by acquisition leaders without being considered by the same legislators who create the legislation in the first place.

Also of note in his comment was his attention to program managers. I am not sure if he misspoke, but the acquisition process would be best served by having a fully functioning IPT of both program personnel (program mangers, engineers, budget analysts, etc.) and contracting personnel (contracting officer, COTR, etc.). In reality it is the contracting personnel that have to adhere to the burdensome rules for acquisition execution, while program managers often are faced with different challenges in respects to acquisition regulations in the execution of programs.

I applaud and thank Mr. Young for his service, as he mentioned his focus during his tenure:

…"People run programs, not documents and processes," he said. "You need to have good people and leave room for judgment to get the best deal for the taxpayer."…

Acquisition reform cannot, and should not, focus just on processes and legislation. It needs to focus on rebuilding a workforce that has been decimated by underdevelopment and being undervalued, which requires a focus on changing the culture of the federal government such that acquisition professionals are seen as strategic business advisors and not an impediment to progress. The approach needs to be balanced, as although Stimulus funding was provided for acquisition workforce improvement issues, I do not believe it is nearly enough to fund workforce issues at civilian agencies when compared to DoD.

One comment from Mr. Young, sadly, was his perceived inability participate in the economy:

…"I don't think you should come into this building and essentially give up any right to participate in the economy," Young said. "You get paid a salary, but beyond that you become almost a monk and get all kinds of restrictions levied on you trying to help your country and do the right thing."…

I don’t think anyone comes into federal service with the intention on getting wealthy. Mr. Young, I am sure, has a very specialized and high-demand skill set that will command a very healthy compensation package wherever he may go. I hope that is the case, but I was disappointed in his comment as he seemed to be bitter at the fact that public service entails sacrifice and a dedication to duty. If he was not willing to make these sacrifices, why serve?